The fusion of social networks and wearable sensors is becoming increasingly popular, with systems like Fitbit automating the process of reporting and sharing user fitness data. In this paper we show that while compelling, the careless integration of health data into social networks is fraught with privacy and security vulnerabilities. Case in point, by reverse engineering the communication protocol, storage details and operation codes, we identified several vulnerabilities in Fitbit. We have built FitBite, a suite of tools that exploit these vulnerabilities to launch a wide range of attacks against Fitbit. Besides eavesdropping, injection and denial of service, several attacks can lead to rewards and financial gains. We have built FitLock, a lightweight defense system that protects Fitbit while imposing only a small overhead. Our experiments on BeagleBoard and Xperia devices show that FitLock's end-to-end overhead over Fitbit is only 2.4%.
I. INTRODUCTION
Online social networks are sites that enable their users to connect and share information with friends and family. Recent advances in wearable, user-friendly devices equipped with smart sensors (e.g., pedometers, heart rate and sleep monitors) and wireless technologies, are facilitating the emergence of social sensor networks (SSNs): social networks that collect and share not only explicit user information (e.g., status updates, location reports) but also implicit health-centric data.
Fitbit [1] , a representative social sensor network centers its existence on fitness sensor data. It consists of (i) trackers, wireless-enabled, wearable devices that record their users' daily step counts, distance traversed, calories burned and floors climbed as well as sleep patterns when worn during the night and (ii) an online social network that automatically captures, displays and shares fitness data of its users. Figure 1 illustrates the basic functionality of Fitbit.
While popular and useful in its encouragement of healthy lifestyles, the combination of health sensors and social networks makes social sensor networks the source of significant privacy and security issues. In this paper we show that Fitbit is vulnerable to a wide range of attacks. Besides standard social networking problems, including infiltration attacks [2] and private data leaks to general account holders 1 , Fitbit is made vulnerable by the wireless nature of tracker communications and poor security practices. 1 Fitbit has suffered criticism due to its initial default access control settings: The reported sensor information was made publicly available on Fitbit's social network. Fitbit relies on a Personal Area Network (PAN) protocol [3] called ANT [4] , that enables trackers to automatically upload their data to the online social network account of their user. The improper design of Fitbit's communication protocol, (i) allows Fitbit users to engineer their fitness data and inject it into their social networking accounts, thus gain financial benefits and (ii) enables external attackers to intercept data reported by trackers of other users, inject arbitrary data into the trackers and online social network accounts of other users, as well as launch denial of service attacks.
In order to expose Fitbit's vulnerabilities, in a first contribution, we have reverse engineered the semantics of tracker memory banks, the command types and the tracker-to-social network communication protocol. In a second contribution, we have built FitBite, a suite of tools that exploit Fitbit's faulty design. We have used FitBite to prove the feasibility of a wide range of attacks. For instance, we show that FitBite allows attackers to capture and modify the data stored on any tracker situated within a radius of 15 ft.
In a third contribution, we propose FitLock, a lightweight extension that uses efficient cryptographic tools to secure the Fitbit protocol. We show that FitLock prevents the FitBite attacks. Our end-to-end implementation on BeagleBoard [5] and Xperia devices shows that the computation and communication overhead imposed by FitLock is small: resource constrained BeagleBoard and Xperia devices can support hundreds of packet encryption and transmission operations per second. Moreover, the end-to-end overhead of the cryptographic operations employed by FitLock over the standard Fitbit protocol is only 2.4% on a Xperia device. The project website containing the source code of FitBite and FitLock is made publicly available at [6] . The paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the Fitbit model, including background on the ANT protocol, and details the attacker model considered. Section III reverse engineers Fitbit and Section IV introduces FitBite, the suite of attack tools. Section V introduces FitLock, our defense extension and proves its security. Section VI describes our implementation results. Section VII describes related work and Section VIII concludes.
II. BACKGROUND AND MODEL
The Fitbit system consists of user tracker devices, user USB base stations and an online social network. Fitbit tracker. The Fitbit tracker is a wearable device that relies on a 3D motion sensor and a barometric pressure sensor to measure the daily steps taken, distance traveled, floors climbed, calories burned, and the duration and intensity of the user exercise. The tracker mainly consists of four IC chips, (i) a MMA7341L 3-axis MEMS accelerometer, (ii) a MSP430F2618 low power TI MCU consisting of 92 KB of flash and 96 KB of RAM, (iii) a nRF24API 2.4 GHz RF chip supporting the ANT protocol (1 Mbits/sec, 15 ft transmission range) and (iv) a MEMS altimeter to count the number of floors climbed. The user can switch between displaying different real-time fitness information on the tracker, using a dedicated hardware switch button (see the arrow pointing to the switch in Figure 2 ). Each tracker has a unique id, called the tracker public id (TPI). Data conversion. The accelerometer and the altimeter allow the tracker to count the steps taken and the floors climbed by the user. The tracker relies on extrapolated walk/run stride length values to convert the step count into the distance covered by the user: the sum of the recorded walking steps times the user walking stride length and of the running steps times the user running stride length. The running steps are identified based on the frequency and intensity of the user's steps. The tracker uses the extrapolated user Basal Metabolic Rate (BMR) [7] values to convert the user's daily activities into the number of calories burned. The base. The second component, the Fitbit base, connects to the user's main compute center (e.g., PC, laptop) and is equipped with a wireless communication chip that enables it to communicate with any tracker within a range of 15 ft. The base acts as a bridge between trackers and the online social network. It sets up connections with all the trackers within its transmission range, then reads and clears up the information stored on the tracker according to commands issued by the social network. Figure 2 shows a snapshot of two trackers and a base, connected to a laptop through a USB port. The webserver. The third component, the online social network, allows users to create accounts from which they befriend and maintain contact with other users. Upon purchase of a Fitbit tracker and base, a user binds the tracker to her social network account. Each social network account has a unique id, called the user public id (UPI). After the base detects and sets up a connection with the tracker, the base automatically collects and reports tracker stored information (step count, distance, calories, sleep patterns) to the corresponding social network account. Based on user preferences, this data is either made public, shared with the user's friends, or kept private. In the following, we use the term webserver to denote the computing resources of the online social network. Tracker-to-base communication: the ANT protocol. Trackers communicate to bases over ANT. ANT is a 2.4 GHz bidirectional wireless Personal Area Network (PAN) communications technology optimized for transferring low-data rate, low-latency data between multiple ANT-enabled devices. The ultra-low power consumption of the ANT chipset guarantees an extended battery life even from low-capacity supplies such as a coin cell battery. This, along with the low implementation cost of ANT, enables its integration and use in a wide range of mobile devices, including smartphones and health sensors.
A. Attacker Model
We assume the existence of not only external attackers but also insiders. External attackers attempt to learn and modify the fitness information reported by the trackers of other users, as well as disrupt the Fitbit protocol. Insiders own Fitbit trackers and may attempt to report fitness values that do not reflect their effort, e.g., inflate reports or replay old values. We assume external attackers do not have physical access to trackers of other users. However, attackers are able to capture wireless communications in their vicinity. Furthermore, we assume that the Fitbit service (e.g. the social network servers) does not collude with attackers to facilitate false data reports.
III. REVERSE ENGINEERING FITBIT
We document here the results of our effort to reverse engineer the Fitbit communication protocol, including the message communication format among the participating devices. Our endeavor has relied on information from libfitbit [8] for open source health hardware access.
Fitbit uses service logs, files that store information concerning communications involving the base. On the Windows installation of the Fitbit software, daily logs are stored in cleartext in files whose names record the hour, minute and second corresponding to the time of the first log occurrence. Each request and response involving the tracker, base and social network is logged and sometimes even documented in the archive folder of that log directory. The logs have proved central to our understanding and reverse engineering of the functionality of Fitbit.
Data retrieved from the tracker to be uploaded to the social network is encoded in base64 format. However, no authentication is used, and all requests are sent in clear HTTP. We have exploited Fitbit's lack of encryption in the messages sent between the base and the tracker to implement a USB based filter driver that separately logs the data flowing to and from the base.
In the following we present details of the organization of the tracker memory banks, then describe the main Fitbit opcodes and then present the reverse engineered Fitbit communication protocol.
A. Memory Banks
A tracker has two types of memory banks, (i) read banks, containing data to be read by the base and (ii) write banks, containing data that can be written by the base. The log data we captured reveals that during the upload session, the webserver reads data from 6 memory banks, writes on 2 write memory banks and clears data from 5 memory banks by sending requests to the tracker through the base. The byte length of memory banks varies. We now briefly describe the most important read and write memory banks. Read banks. The read bank #1 stores the daily user fitness records. Each record is 16 bytes long. It starts with a 4 byte long timestamp, followed by the number of calories, steps, distance and floor count. Both steps and distance are stored on four bytes while the calories and the floor count are stored on two bytes. To ensure reliability, Fitbit stores the important fitness records (e.g., step and floor count) on multiple memory banks. Write banks. The write bank #0 stores 64 bytes concerning the device settings as specified on the user's Fitbit account (the "Device Settings" and "Profile Settings" links). The write bank #1 stores 16 bytes that contain the daily user fitness records whose data format is similar to the read memory bank 0.
B. Opcodes and Responses
The webserver communicates with a tracker through a base. The communication is embedded in XML blocks, that contain base64 encoded opcodes -commands for the tracker. Opcodes are 7 bytes long. We briefly list below the most important opcodes and their corresponding responses. The opcode types are also shown in Figure 3 .
Retrieve device information (TRQ-REQ): opcode
[0x24, 0(6times)]. Upon receiving this opcode from the webserver (via the base), the tracker includes in a reply its serial number (5 bytes), the hardware revision number, and whether the tracker is plugged in on the base. Read/write tracker memory. To read a memory bank, the webserver needs to issue the READ-TRQ opcode, [0x22, index, 0(5times)], where index denotes the memory bank requested. The response embeds the content 
C. The Fitbit Communication Protocol
In the following, for brevity, we use the notation "URL" to denote the full URL http://client.fitbit.com. The data flow between the tracker, base and the webserver during the data upload operation, illustrated in Figure 3 , is divided into 4 phases, beginning at steps 2, 3, 5 and 7:
1) Upon receiving a beacon from the tracker, the base establishes a connection with the tracker. 2) Phase 1: The base contacts the webserver at the URL/device/tracker/uploadData and sends basic client and platform information. 3) Phase 2: The webserver sends the tracker id and the opcode for retrieving tracker information (TRQ-REQ). 4) The base contacts the specified tracker, retrieves its information TRQ-INFO (serial number, firmware version, etc.) and sends it to the webserver at the URL/device/tracker/dumpData/lookupTracker. 5) Phase 3: Given the tracker's serial number, the webserver retrieves the associated tracker public id (TPI) and user public id (UPI) values. The webserver sends to the base the TPI/UPI values along with the opcodes for retrieving fitness data from the tracker (READ-TRQ). 6) The base forwards the TPI and UPI values and the opcodes to the tracker, retrieves the fitness data from the tracker (TRQ-DATA) and sends it to the webserver at the URL/device/tracker/dumpData/dumpData. 7) Phase 4: The webserver sends to the base opcodes to WRITE updates provided by the user in her Fitbit social network account (device and profile settings, e.g., body and personal information, time zone, etc). This operation takes place irrespective of whether the user has updated her settings since the last communication with the tracker or not. The base forwards the WRITE opcode and the updates to the tracker, who overwrites the previous values on its write memory banks. 8) The webserver sends opcodes to ERASE the fitness data from the tracker. The base forwards the ERASE request to the tracker, who then erases the contents of the corresponding read memory banks. 9) The base forwards the response codes for the executed opcodes from the tracker to the webserver at the URL/device/tracker/dumpData/clearDataConfigTracker. 10) The webserver replies to the base with the opcode to CLOSE the tracker. 11) The base requests the tracker to SLEEP for 15 minutes, before sending its next beacon.
IV. FITBITE: ATTACKING FITBIT
We first describe two vulnerabilities of Fitbit, followed by details of the attacks we have deployed to exploit these vulnerabilities.
A. Vulnerabilities
Cleartext login information. During the initial user login via the Fitbit client software, user passwords are passed to the website in cleartext (as part of POST data) and then stored in the log files. Figure 4 shows a snippet of captured data, with the cleartext authentication credentials emphasized. Cleartext HTTP Data processing. When syncing data to the website, no data protection/authentication is used -all requests are sent over plain HTTP. Capturing tracker data and injecting data into trackers and social network accounts becomes thus possible.
B. The FitBite Tool
We have built FitBite, a suite of tools that exploit the above vulnerabilities to attack Fitbit. FitBite consists of two modules. The Base Module (BM) is used to retrieve data from the tracker, inject false values and upload them into the account of the corresponding user on the webserver. The Tracker Module (TM) is used to read and write the tracker data. FitBite implements the following attacks. Tracker Private Data Capture (TPDC). FitBite uses the TM module to discover any tracker device within a radius of 15 ft and capture the fitness information stored on the tracker. This attack can be launched in public spaces, particularly those frequented by Fitbit users (e.g., parks, sports venues, etc). Tracker Injection (TI) Attack. FitBite uses the TM module along with knowledge of the data and memory bank formats and required opcode instructions to modify any of the "realtime" fitness data stored on neighboring trackers. FitBite allows the attacker to choose the data to be modified. It then reads the data from the storing memory bank and modifies the target bytes while keeping the remaining locations unmodified. The TM can act however modify simultaneously multiple fitness records (memory banks). Figure 5 shows an example of a victim tracker, displaying an inflated value for the (daily) number of steps taken by its user. Note that the tracker's owner (an insider) can also launch this attack. User Account Injection (UAI) Attack. Fitbit allows a tracker to report its data to the user's social network account through any USB base in its vicinity (15 ft. radius). Specifically, in step 6.b of the Fitbit protocol (see Figure 3 ) the base sends the data to the webserver at the Fig. 7 . Earndit points and available gift cards URL/device/tracker/dumpData/dumpData. FitBite enables an attacker to hijack the data reported by trackers in its vicinity, through the attacker's corrupt USB base. FitBite uses the BM module to launch the data injection attack by fabricating a data reply embedding the desired fitness data (encoded in the base64 format). The BM sends the reply as an XML block in an HTTP request to the web server. The webserver does not authenticate the request message and does not check for data consistency -thus it accepts the data. Figure 6 shows a snapshot of one account where we have successfully injected the number of steps taken by the "account owner", while keeping the other values intact. This shows that (i) FitBite can inject an unreasonable daily step count (12.58 million) into the account of any tracker owner located in its vicinity and (ii) Fitbit does not check data consistency -the 12.58 million steps are shown to correspond to 0.02 traveled miles. Free Badges. By successful injection of large values in their social networking accounts, FitBite enables insiders to achieve special milestones and acquire merit badges, without doing the required work. Figure 6 shows that the injected value of 12.58 million steps, being greater than 40,000, enables the account owner to acquire a "Top Daily Step" badge. Free Financial Rewards. Fitbit users can link their social networking accounts to systems that reward users for exercising, e.g., Earndit [9] provides gift cards and financial prizes. An Earndit user receives 0.75 points for each of her "very active" Fitbit minute and 0.10 points per a "fairly active" minute. By keeping the BM module running and continuously updating the tracker data (once each 15 minutes), FitBite allows an insider to easily record "fairly active" minutes. We have created an Earndit account, linked it to one of our Fitbit accounts and used FitBite to accumulate a variety of undeserved rewards. Figure 7 shows an example where we have accumulated 200 Earndit points, that can be redeemed to a $20 gift card. Battery Drain Attack. FitBite allows the attacker to continuously query trackers in her vicinity, thus drain their batteries at a faster rate. To understand the efficiency of this attack, we have experimented with 3 operation modes. First, the daily upload mode, where the tracker syncs with the USB base and the Fitbit account once per day. Second, the 15 mins upload mode, where we kept the tracker within 15 ft. of the base, thus allowing it to be queried once every 15 minutes. Finally, the attack mode, where FitBite's TM module continuously (an average of 4 times a minute) queried the victim tracker. In order to not raise suspicions, the BM module uploaded tracker data into the webserver only once every 15 minutes. Figure 8 shows our battery experiment results for the three modes. In the daily upload mode, the battery lasted for 29 days. In the 15 mins upload mode, the battery lasted for 186.38 hours (7 days and 18 hours). In the attack mode, the battery lasted for a total of 32.71 hours. While this attack is not fast enough to impact trackers targeted by casual attackers, it shows that FitBite drains the tracker battery around 21 times faster than the 1 day upload mode and 5.63 times faster than the 15 mins upload mode. Denial of Service. FitBite's injection attack can be used to prevent users from correctly updating their real-time statistics. A tracker can display up to 6 digit values. Thus, when the injected value exceeds 6 digits, the least significant digits can not be displayed on the tracker. This prevents the user from keeping track of her daily performance evolution. Mule Attacks. Besides attacks exploiting Fitbit's unprotected wireless communications, adversaries may also launch physical, mule attacks, by attaching trackers to various moving objects. This enables the adversary to increase fitness parameters with significantly less effort than walking. In a first, rope attack, the adversary spins the tracker attached to a rope (Figure 9 (a) illustrates this attack). Our experiments show that the step count increase in the rope attack is a function of the rope length. For a 1ft rope, the step count increases by 1 for each circumvolution; for a 2ft rope length, the step count increases by 2 per circumvolution.
While the rope attack requires perseverance, in a second, wheel attack, the adversary attaches a tracker to a car wheel. This enables the attacker to effortlessly increase the recorded step count, distance and calorie values when driving. Figure 9 (b) shows a picture of our "testbed". We have experimented with this setup, by driving the car over several 20 minutes sessions. Figure 9 4 minute granularity. At the end of the experiment, the tracker recorded 1166 steps, 211 calories and 0.9 miles (1.44km).
We used the "My Tracks" Android application [10] which relies on GPS readings to measure the average speed and distance traversed by the car. At an average speed of 16.53kmh, the tracker increases the step count by approx. 58 steps per minute. The tire type is P17565R14, with a radius of 11.48 inches and a circumference of 72.12 inches (≈ 1.83m). The tracker was placed 5.85 inches apart from the center of the tire. Thus, for the circular path of the tracker, the circumference is 36.76 inches (≈ 0.93m).
The average distance covered by the car for each 20 minutes session was 5.51km, when the tire rotated 5510/1.83=3010 times. Given the tracker's circumference (0.93m), the tracker actually travels 2.8km for the 3010 times tire rotations. The running stride length of the user bonded with the test tracker is approx. 0.9m, which converts the 2.8km into 3111 steps. While these values (2.8km/3111 steps) are inconsistent with the 1.44km/1166 steps recorded by the tracker, we note that the tracker's values are consistent: the tracker converts the steps into distance according to the user stride length.
V. FITLOCK: PROTECTING FITBIT
A good Fitbit solution needs to (i) protect against internal and external attackers, by authenticating the system participants, ensuring the confidentiality, integrity and freshness of system information, and preventing denial of service attacks, while simultaneously (ii) taking into consideration the extreme resource limitations of Fitbit trackers. In this section we introduce FitLock, a solution that secures the Fitbit system and is efficient in terms of the imposed computation, storage and communication overheads.
A. The Solution
FitLock consists of a bind procedure (BindUserTracker), where the user associates a new tracker to her online social network account and an upload procedure (UploadData), where the tracker reports information upon demand from the social network. Each tracker T has a unique serial number id T and a secret symmetric encryption key sk T , shared with the webserver. These values are stored in a write-once-read-many (WORM) area of the tracker's memory banks. The tracker never reveals (e.g., displays or communicates) the secret key. The webserver stores a database M ap that associates a tracker id to tracker related data, including symmetric key, user id and session id. Initially, M ap only maps tracker ids into corresponding symmetric encryption keys.
Let Id A denote the unique user id of the account that user A has on the Fitbit social network. In the following, we use the notation F (P 1 (args 1 ), .., P n (args n )) to denote a protocol F running between participants P 1 ,..P n , each with its own input arguments. For instance, the following BindTrackerUser protocol involves user A, with her account id and a time interval s as input arguments, her tracker T, with its id and secret key as arguments, her base B with no arguments and the (Fitbit) webserver WS, with its M ap structure as input argument. The BindTrackerUser protocol allows user A to bind her new tracker to her social network account (illustrated in Figure 10 ).
BindTrackerUser(A(Id A ,s),T(id T , sk T ),B(),WS(Map)). User A logs in into her account on the Fitbit social network (step 1 in Figure 10) . A presses T's switch button for s seconds (step 2). Upon this action, the tracker T reports its identifier id T in cleartext to WS, through the user's base (step 3). WS uses the Map structure to retrieve the symmetric key associated with the id T , i.e., sk T (step 4). It then generates a 6 digit long random value, N (step 5). WS sends to T the request value
where T ime is WS's current time (step 6). WS keeps track of all requests sent to trackers and pending responses, indexed under the tracker id and the nonce value. WS associates an expiration time with each entry, and removes entries as they expire without being answered.
Upon reception of this message, T uses its symmetric key, sk T , to decrypt it. It verifies the freshness (the T ime value) and authenticates WS through its ability to have encrypted this message, containing the string "WS", using the key sk T . If the verifications succeed, the tracker displays the 6 digit random nonce N (step 7). User A reads and enters this nonce into a confirmation box in her Fitbit social network account (step 9). Then, if WS finds any pending (not expired) request matching the value entered by the user, WS associates Id A to id T and sk T in the M ap structure (step 10). WS removes this request from the list of pending requests.
The following procedure, UploadData, is used to secure the Fitbit communication protocol described in Section III. It involves a tracker T (taking as arguments its id id T , secret key sk T , stored fitness data, expiration interval δt and retry counter r), a base B (with no arguments) and the webserver WS (with its M ap structure and the same expiration intervals and counter as T).
All communication between T and WS is encrypted with their shared key sk T . Each communication session between WS and T has a monotonically increasing session id S wst . T and WS do not accept messages with older session id numbers. UploadData(T(id T ,sk T ,data,δt,r),B(),WS(Map,δt,r)). A new session starts only after the tracker's beacon is received by the base and the base sets up a connection with the tracker (step 1). Within each session, the communication between WS and T starts with a request from WS followed by a response from T. Each request contains a request type REQ ∈ {TRQ-REQ, READ-TRQ, WRITE, ERASE, CLOSE} (see Figure 3) , and a counter C ws encoding the number of times this particular request has been re-transmitted. Within a session, T stores the latest C ws received from W S for any request type, or -1 if no request has been received yet. Thus, a request from WS to T has the format
where S wst is the current session id and C ws is set to 0 for the first transmission of the current REQ type. Upon receiving such a message, the base B uses id T to route the packet to the correct tracker T in its vicinity. T uses its secret key to decrypt the packet and authenticate WS: verify that the first field is a meaningful request type, the second field contains the current session id and the value of the third field exceeds its currently stored value for REQ. If either verification fails, T drops the packet. Otherwise, T stores the received C ws value, associated with the REQ type for the current session, and replies to this request with
where RESP ∈ {TRQ-INFO, TRQ-DATA, CLEAR} denotes T's response type (see Figure 3 ) and C T is its counter (initialized to 0).
WS waits a predefined interval δt to receive the reply RESP from T. If it does not receive it in time, WS repeats the request, with an incremented counter C ws . If WS's re-transmission counter reaches a maximum value, r, and no corresponding RESP is received within the δt interval, WS increments the session id S wst . Similarly, if C's re-transmission counter reaches the maximum value r and the next request is not received from WS, T increments S wst . This means that T and WS consider themselves to have been disconnected and their next communication needs to start from the beginning (step 1 of Figure 3) ) with a new session id. If T receives a REQ from WS that has a session id larger (by 1) than its current session id, T drops the data associated with the current session, and begins a new session with the incremented session id.
At the successful completion of a session, both T and WS increment the session id S wst . WS stores this value in Map indexed under id T .
B. Data Consistency
As mentioned in Section II, there exists a strong relationship between the different activity parameters tracked by Fitbit. However, as demonstrated by the UAI attack in Section IV, Fitbit does not verify the consistency of the data reported by trackers. FitLock addresses this vulnerability: Whenever new user data is uploaded on the webserver, FitLock uses the walk/run stride length and the BMR values to verify the relations between the number of steps (walking and running) and the distance traversed and the calories burned by the user. If the relations do not hold (including an error margin), FitLock considers that the data has been victim of an injection attack.
C. Analysis
We now prove several properties of FitLock. Theorem 1: Without physical access to the tracker, an attacker cannot hijack the tracker during the BindT rackerU ser procedure.
Proof: A tracker hijack attack, takes place during a normal execution of the BindT rackerU ser procedure by a victim user for her tracker T. The adversary attempts to bind the victim tracker T to another user account, potentially controlled by the attacker. Let M denotes the Fitbit account owned by the adversary. Without physical access to the tracker, the adversary cannot read the 6 digit random nonce displayed on the tracker and upload it in M . However, the adversary is able to capture packets exchanged by WS and T during a BindT rackerU ser procedure. The adversary could then attempt launch a rush attack. In a rush attack, the adversary decrypts a captured packet, recovers the nonce N sent by WS to T, and uploads it in M , before the valid user.
Rush attacks are prevented by the semantic security of the encryption scheme of FitLock -the adversary cannot recover the nonce.
FitLock prevents the TPDC attack through the use of semantically secure encryption. The non-malleability of the encryption also prevents injection TI, UAI and ensuing free badge and financial rewards attacks, generated from previously captured (encrypted) messages. The use of session identifiers and re-transmission counters prevents replay attacks.
Theorem 2: FitLock prevents DoS and Battery Drain attacks.
Proof: (Sketch) FitLock's use of semantically secure symmetric encryption to protect communications, prevents attackers from obtaining a response from trackers. The attacker cannot replay requests with old session ids or old counters (for the current session id): Upon receiving invalid requests or requests with old session ids or old counter values, the tracker drops them, thus does not consume power to answer them. Thwarting mule attacks. The sensors present in Fitbit trackers are insufficient to prevent insider, mule attacks: the adversary has control over the tracker and the step count recorded by the tracker is consistently converted into distance and calorie values. We propose however two defenses against this attack, relying on the addition of new sensors on Fitbit trackers.
A first solution relies on GPS chips installed in Fitbit trackers. Broadcom offers BCM4752 [11], an inexpensive, energy efficient (it uses 50% less power than equivalent receivers), small (takes up nearly half the size of comparable chips) and performant -delivers 10 times more accurate readings, and works indoors. By comparing the distance recorded by the GPS receiver against the distance recorded by the tracker, we can discover inconsistencies both for rope and wheel attacks. During a rope attack, the GPS location does not change. During a wheel attack the GPS location changes too much compared to the number of recorded steps.
A second solution relies on the inclusion of a small heartrate monitor (HRM) which can be well suited inside the Fitbit tracker (e.g., the AD8232 AFE [12] which comes in a 4 × 4mm sized package). The HRM device measures cardiovascular electrical signals from the heart and the tracker only records the user's activity if it gets such signals from the user. It ensures that the user is actually wearing the tracker, thus trivially preventing rope or wheel attacks.
VI. EVALUATION

A. Experimental Setup
We implemented FitLock in Android. We have tested the tracker side of FitLock on a Revision C4 of the Beagle-Board [5] and an Xperia smartphone. The BeagleBoard uses the OMAP 3530 DCCB72 720 MHz version and uses a 4500 mAh Li-ion battery to power our system through a special, 2-pin barrel jack. The Sony Ericsson Xperia X10 mini smartphone features an ARM 11 CPU @600 MHz and 128MB RAM with Android OS Eclair 2.1. Similar to the Fitbit tracker, the Xperia device supports ANT+. In addition, we have used two Dell laptops, one equipped with a 2.4GHz Intel Core i5 and 4GB of RAM, was used for the web server (built on the Apache web server 2.4) and the other, equipped with a 2.3GHz Intel Core i5 and 4GB of RAM, was used for the base.
We implemented a client-server Bluetooth [13] socket communication protocol between the tracker (Xperia smartphone) and the base using PyBluez [14] python library. In PyBluez, each device acts as a server and other connected devices act as clients in P2P communications. For connectivity between the base and the webserver, the laptops use their own 802.11b/g Wi-Fi interfaces. Figure 11 shows a snapshot of our testbed.
For encryption we experimented with RC4 [15] , AES [16] and the Salsa20 [17] stream cipher, selected in the final eSTREAM portfolio [18] . The 20-round Salsa20 is built on a pseudorandom function based on 32-bit addition, bitwise addition (XOR) and rotation operations. It uses a 256-bit key, a 64-bit nonce, and a 64-bit stream position to a 512-bit output. As of 2012, there are no published attacks on the full Salsa20/20; the best attack known [19] breaks 8 of the 20 rounds.
B. Results
In the following, all reported values are averages taken over at least 10 independent protocol runs. Key generation overhead. We have first measured the overhead of generating (AES) secret keys. Figure 12 shows the overhead on the laptop and the Xperia device, when the key bit size ranges from 64 to 1024 bits. Note that even a resource constrained smartphone takes only 2.46 ms to generate 1024 bit keys (0.62ms on the laptop). FitLock overhead on tracker. A potential bottleneck of FitLock is in the encryption of packets by the tracker. In order to verify if this can be the case, we compared the performance of RC4, Salsa20 and AES. We set the key size to 128 bits. We ran these protocols both on the BeagleBoard and the Xperia while the packet size ranges from 32 bytes to 1024 bytes. Figure 13 (a) shows the execution time of the three protocols on the Xperia smartphone. For small packet sizes, Salsa20 performs the best. As the packet size increases, RC4 performs slight better than Salsa20. Both RC4 and Salsa20 outperform AES for any packet size. Even for a packet size of 1024 bytes, the average encryption times for RC4, Salsa20 and AES are only 3.24ms, 4.62ms and 4.83ms respectively. In Figure 13(b) , we compared the encryption overhead of Salsa20 when running on the BeagleBoard and on the Xperia smartphone. The BeagleBoard performs better due to its more powerful CPU: it takes only 3.64ms to encrypt 1024 bytes packets. Thus, both the BeagleBoard and the Xperia device are able to generate hundreds of packet encryptions per second, making encryption an unlikely source of bottlenecks. FitLock overhead on webserver. We further examined the packet decryption overhead on the webserver using the above mentioned protocols. Figure 13( Figure 14 shows our results split into the times of each of the 4 phases of the webserver-to-tracker communication protocol described in Figure 3 . We have set the secret key size to 256 bits. The endto-end (sum over all 4 phases) time of the FitLock protocol is 1518ms. The total time of Fitbit is 1481ms. Thus, FitLock adds an overhead of 37ms, accounting for 2.4.% of Fitbit's time.
VII. RELATED WORK
Halperin et al. [20] demonstrated attacks on pacemakers and implantable cardiac defibrillators, and proposed zero-power defenses. Similarly, Li et. al. [21] demonstrated successful security attacks on a commercially deployed glucose monitoring and insulin delivery system and provided defenses against the proposed attacks. Proximity-based access control [22] has been proposed as a technique for implantable medical devices to verify the distance of the communicating peer before initiating wireless communication, thereby limiting attackers to a certain physical range. Although similar in overall objectives, our work differs significantly in the attack methodologies and proposed defenses.
Barnickel et al. [23] targeted security and privacy issues for HealthNet, a health monitoring and recording system. They proposed a security and privacy aware architecture, relying on data avoidance, data minimization, decentralized storage, and the use of cryptography. Marti et al. [24] described the requirements and implementation of the security mechanisms for MobiHealth, a wireless mobile health care system. Mo-biHealth relies on Bluetooth and ZigBee link layer security for communication to the sensors and uses HTTPS mutual authentication and encryption for connections to the backend.
Lim et al. [25] analyzed the security of a remote cardiac monitoring system. The data transfer was modeled as starting from the sensors, reaching a Body Area network (BAN) gateway, then a wireless router and through the Internet to a final monitoring server. Muraleedharan et al. [26] proposed two types of possible denial-of-service attacks including Sybil [27] and wormhole [28] attacks in a health monitoring system using wireless sensor networks. They further proposed an energyefficient cognitive routing algorithm to deal with those attacks.
Sriram et. al. [29] took an in-depth look at potential health-monitoring usage scenarios and highlighted research challenges required to ensure and assess quality of sensor data in health-monitoring systems. The work of Stanford [30] stresses the need of meeting stringent privacy and security requirements, especially to protect confidential medical records and the organizations and end users that employ them. Bottom line. Most related work either (i) proposes a novel system with embedded defense mechanisms to handle security and privacy issues or (ii) introduces different attacks against the wireless network communication in a health monitoring system. Our work not only provides hands-on attacks for a popular fitness and healthcare tracking system but also provides efficient end-to-end defenses and proves their efficacy in preventing and thwarting attacks.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we discussed security and privacy issues related to a renowned and widely accepted and used fitness tracking system. We showed that through reverse engineering of the ANT protocol and data communication, both passive and active attacks can be launched on the system using offthe-shelf software module. We then analyzed the various attack scenarios and also proposed various types of possible defenses against them. We believe that our proposed attack methodology and defenses may be applicable to several wearable and implantable healthcare systems. Healthcare appliance security is a critical challenge that demands the immediate attention of the research community.
